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Abstract 
The financialisation literature has grown over the past decades. Despite a generally accepted 
definition, financialisation has been used to describe different phenomena. We distinguish between 
financialisation of non-financial companies, households and the financial sector and use activity and 
vulnerability measures. We identify seven financialisation hypotheses in the literature and empirically 
investigate them in a cross-country analysis for 17 OECD countries and two time periods, 1997-2007 
as well as 2008-2017. We find different financialisation measures are only weakly correlated, 
suggesting the existence of distinct financialisation processes. There is strong evidence that 
financialisation is linked to asset price inflation and correlated with a debt-driven demand regime. 
Financial deregulation encourages financialisation. There is limited evidence that market-based 
financial systems are more financialised. Foreign financial inflows do not seem a main driver. We do 
not find indication that an investment slowdown precedes financialisation. Our findings suggest 
financialisation should be understood as variegated process, playing out differently across economic 
sectors and countries. 
Keywords:  financialisation, cross country analysis, financial deregulation, property prices  
JEL classification: B50, G20, P52 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the term was coined in the early 1990s financialisation has become a popular topic in 
academic research, expanding its reach even into the financial press, with Forbes magazine 
warning that financialisation is “running amok” (Denning, 2014). The established working 
definition sees financialisation as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and international 
economies” (Epstein, 2005, p. 3). Because this definition is so broad, the term has been used 
to describe a range of different phenomena. Bridging social sciences, financialisation 
research can be broadly classified into the following three streams. Economists, especially 
those writing in the post-Keynesian or Marxist tradition, tend to either address the systemic 
(macroeconomic) level or adopt a firm-focused approach at the mesoeconomic level. Political 
scientists, in particular those close to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach, have also 
adopted the macroeconomic view, identifying financialisation as part of the market-based 
financial system. In both, the macro- and mesoeconomic analysis, the changing interaction 
between financial sector and non-financial companies (NFC) is the analytical focus. Cultural 
Political Economy (CPE) research, in contrast, stresses the (microeconomic) impact of 
financialisation on the everyday life of the individual. Here the research purpose is to assess 
the changing position of households vis-à-vis the financial sector. While this diversity has 
enriched the financialisation debate, it has adversely affected the clarity and coherence of the 
research agenda. This paper aims at identifying the different interpretations of 
financialisation, clarifying the arguments and their explanatory power.  
Empirically, financialisation research has focused either on changes within individual 
countries over time, with strong emphasis on the US as the archetypal financialised economy 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Krippner, 2005), or on specific sectors across a small 
number of countries. This has created an analytical gap in the area of cross-country 
comparison over time for larger samples of countries. A notably exception is the study by 
Maxfield, Winecoff and Young (2017) across 14 OECD economies. However, their 
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investigation focuses only on the financial sector and specifically leverage among financial 
firms, assessing whether there is a convergence towards financialised practices among these 
companies. They find convergence among large, transnationally operating financial firms but 
significant variation otherwise. The need for more cross-country and sectoral analysis has 
been acknowledged with more comparative studies across countries published recently (see 
Gospel, Pendelton and Vitols (2014) for an approach based on the VoC literature; Becker et 
al. (2010) for a comparison of financialisation experiences across four emerging economies 
and Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) for a sectoral study comparing the US, UK, France, 
Germany and Japan). However, while there are cross-country comparisons across a small 
handful of economies, there is little systematic cross-country analysis especially for large 
samples. 
The dominant focus on the US has introduced two biases in the literature. First, it has 
encouraged an understanding of financialisation that uses the US experience as the key 
reference point. Other countries are then evaluated against this experience (e.g. Maxfield et 
al., 2017; Robinson, 2017). Second, financialisation has been regarded as driven by a central 
logic, implying different parts of the economy are experiencing financialisation in parallel. 
This view emerges from the idea that financialisation is a symptom of mature capitalism, 
which has at its core a ‘stagist’ understanding of capitalist development based on 
convergence. Engelen and Konings (2010) call this the modernist thesis of institutional 
convergence which states that with the increasing dominance of financial markets in 
capitalism economies’ institutional differences decline. We will refer to this as the strong 
financialisation view. 
The first contribution of the paper is to identify testable hypotheses about financialisation and 
test them econometrically. We distil seven causal hypotheses about financialisation from the 
literature: First, the strong financialisation view argues that there is a single financialisation 
process and different sectoral financialisation measures will thus be correlated (H1). Second, 
some Marxists have argued that financialisation is the results of a (prior) secular slowdown in 
profitability and investment rates (H2). Third, financialisation is driven by financial 
deregulation (H3). Forth, financialisation is essentially a shift towards market-based financial 
systems (H4). Fifth, some post-Keynesian authors have argued that financialisation should be 
understood as part of a debt-driven demand regime (in contrast to export-driven or wage-led 
demand regimes) (H5). Sixth, development economists have argued that financialisation is 
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driven by foreign financial inflows (H6). Seventh, Minskyans interpret financialisation as 
driven by asset price inflation (H7).  
Secondly, we offer a cross-country analysis of financialisation across three sectors, i.e. 
households, NFCs and the financial sector, for 17 OECD countries spanning the decade 
before the global financial crisis (1997-2007) as well as the decade after the crisis (2008-
2017). Since we are interested in institutional change, which is slow in nature, we use decade 
averages in our analysis. Treating the two time periods separately acknowledges the 
institutional rupture brought about by the global financial crisis. We use activity as well as 
vulnerability measures of financialisation. Activity measures capture the financial flows such 
as the share of gross financial income in total income of NFCs and are habitually used in the 
literature (see Krippner, 2005). Vulnerability measures, inspired by Minskyan analysis, 
account for stocks of debt relative to income, exemplified in the ratio of household debt to 
disposable GDP.  
While this paper fills an analytical gap by providing the first systematic analysis of the three 
private-sector aggregates across a large number of economies, there are limitations to the 
cross-country approach. Such a perspective runs the danger of downplaying sub-national and 
super-national factors (although international finance and implicitly financial centres play a 
role in H3 and H6). However, our analysis does not regard nation states as homogenous 
spaces as we emphasize the different sectoral dynamics of financialisation. Our cross-country 
analysis is part of the division of labour with other financialisation approaches. It is 
complementary to studies that go beyond the nation state and that investigate changes over 
time particularly in the public sector. 
Our findings can be summarised as follows. Financialisation takes multiple forms across 
countries with little support for the strong view of financialisation. We do not find evidence 
that the secular slowdown in investment is linked to financialisation. The claim that the 
market-based/bank-based distinction can help identify financialisation or that financial capital 
inflows drive financialisation can only be substantiated to a limited extent. We do find a 
general effect, i.e. evidence across different sectors, that financial deregulation contributes 
towards financialisation and that a debt-driven demand regime is linked to financialisation. 
Most notably, asset price bubbles (in housing markets) are associated with financialisation, 
proving to be linked to the financialisation of households, non-financial firms and the finance 
sector.  
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Our evidence suggests that financialisation is multifaceted in the sense that it plays out in 
distinct and potentially conflicting processes across macroeconomic sectors. For instance, 
household financialisation linked to higher consumer debt is likely to spur economic activity 
while the financialisation of NFCs tends to dampen investment and therefore growth. 
Consequently, global forces – such as international financial flow or financial liberalisation – 
will affect countries differently depending on domestic institutions and sectoral make-ups. 
Therefore, we argue that financialisation is a variegated phenomenon, creating different 
concrete economic outcomes across countries in the presence of global forces.  The rest of the 
paper is organised in the following way. The next section reviews the financialisation debate, 
tracing the emergence of the seven research hypotheses formulated by us. Section 3 states the 
research hypotheses in formal terms. Section 4 then discusses the data gathered and 
methodology used. Subsequently, our test results are put forward and discussed in detail in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes summarising the implications of our findings for 
financialisation theory and future research.   
 
2. Financialisation debates: An overview 
As the phenomenon of financialisation has slowly moved into the focus of the academic 
mainstream (especially in sociology, see Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011), the concept has 
been refined and research foci have shifted over the past two decades. Tracing the origins of 
financialisation the research agenda can be broadly classified into three categories. 
Economists tend to address the concept systemically, stressing changing macroeconomic 
structures and their impact on financial stability (see Becker et al., 2010). Alternatively, they 
address the mesoeconomic level, focusing on the firm (see van Treeck, 2009, who makes a 
similar distinction between the two levels of analysis). As far as its foundation in economic 
theory is concerned the financialisation debate is firmly rooted in non-mainstream 
approaches, with strong influences of post-Keynesian theory, especially Kaleckian theory of 
demand regimes and Minsky’s analysis of financial instability, and Marxist theory. The 
systemic perspective is also shared by political scientists particularly proponents of the VoC 
approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Macro- and mesoeconomic analyses centre on the 
changing interaction between non-financial corporations and the financial sector. In contrast, 
research in the area of CPE has emphasised the increasing impact of financial institutions on 
everyday life (Montgomerie, 2009; van der Zwan, 2014). Here the individual (and by 
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extension the household) is in the microeconomic analytical focus.
1
 Since the coining of the 
term ‘financialisation’ in the early 1990s, the three research agendas have widened, resulting 
in increasing overlap. The financial crisis has sparked increased interested in the question of 
household financialisation among economists (Barba and Pivetti, 2008; Stockhammer, 2013; 
Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2016), while sociologists reacted by integrating the non-
financial corporate sector more into their analysis (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011).  
Initial impulses for the financialisation debate came from the notable economic changes 
underway in OECD countries since the 1970s. These include the deregulation of financial 
markets, a wave of financial innovation, changes in corporate governance, and increases in 
household debt. Macroeconomically, over the same period investment rates declined, income 
inequality grew, and financial instability increased. 
An early predecessor of the financialisation debate can be found in historical analyses of 
institutional differences across financial systems. Inspired by Gerschenkron’s work (1962) on 
economic development in Europe, a typology of countries emerged in the course of the 1980s 
(Carrington and Edwards, 1979; Zysman, 1983; Rybczynski, 1984; Berglöf, 1991), 
distinguishing between bank-based and market-based economies. Bank-based financial 
systems were characterised by tight rapports between big banks and large corporations, 
exemplified in the economies of Germany and Japan. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon economies 
with their more dispersed ownership structures and active capital markets were classified as 
market-based. Initially, the market-based financial system was blamed for slowing 
investment rates, for instance in the UK (Carrington and Edwards, 1979) vis-à-vis Germany 
and Japan. The slowdown in investment rates in Anglo-Saxon economies has also been in the 
centre of the Marxist debate on financialisation. Within the Marxist literature the idea 
emerged that dampened profitability of real production induced non-financial firms to 
concentrate on financial activity instead (Brenner, 2002; Krippner, 2005; Vidal, 2012), 
explaining the observed investment slowdown. This provides us with H2, namely that 
financialisation is the result of a secular slowdown in investment rates.  
In the 1990s, corporate finance researchers (Mayer, 1987, 1990; Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996, 
1997) observed that these fundamental distinctions among countries’ financial systems were 
increasingly blurred. Schaberg (1999) put forward the hypothesis that a shift from bank-based 
economies towards a more market-based set-up was under way, which dampened investment 
activity by non-financial corporations. This argument has left a lasting impression on the 
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financialisation debate, in which the process of financialisation is often still understood as a 
shift from bank-based to market-based financial institutions (see Aglietta and Breton, 2001; 
Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013). 
This line of research has been further pursued by the VoC literature. Hall and Soskice (2001) 
classify countries into liberal market economies (LMEs), where competitive markets direct 
economic activity, and coordinated market economies (CMEs), where non-market relations 
are more important for such coordination. The categorisation is closely linked to the bank-
based/market-based dichotomy. LMEs are characterised by strong market activity, including 
active and deep financial markets, whereas in CMEs relationship banking is dominant. Here 
financial institutions are understood as functional with respect to productive structures. 
Because of the inherent complementarities LMEs should be more prone to financialisation, 
making the dichotomy a potential tool to identify financialised economies. However, the 
understanding of financialisation as shift from bank-based to market-based financial 
structures is controversial.
2
 The dichotomous categorisation of countries’ financial systems 
into ideal types has been challenged on conceptual as well as empirical grounds (Corbett, 
1987
3
; Lazonick, 2010; Bruff, 2011; Dixon, 2012). We will investigate whether the process 
of financialisation is related to a shift from bank-based to market-based financial systems as 
H4.  
In parallel to the research on systemic macroeconomic changes in financial institutions, a 
literature focusing on the interaction between non-financial corporations and the financial 
sector at the mesoeconomic level emerged. This strand of the financialisation debate stresses 
the modifications that the relationship between shareholders and other stakeholders in large 
corporations were undergoing since the 1980s, which saw a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
activity among listed non-financial firms, especially in the US. In mainstream economics, this 
increase in stock market activity was hailed as a mechanism to increase market discipline 
among corporate managers (Jensen, 1986; see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 for a survey). Thus, 
the changes in financial markets were interpreted as improvements to corporate governance, 
resulting in higher pressure on managing directors to act efficiently, maximising profits and 
reducing wastage. In contrast, critical voices among the management and organisations 
researchers (Froud et al., 2000) pointed towards the adverse impact of rising shareholder 
value orientation among listed non-financial firms. The new focus on financial pay-outs, 
necessitating short-term profits, was identified as a reason for the slowing investment and 
employment activity of listed companies (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).  
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The critical view on shareholder value orientation was backed by post-Keynesian and 
Regulationist macroeconomic research, exploring the adverse impact of financialisation on 
macroeconomic stability and aggregate demand. Based on a post-Keynesian theory of the 
firm, Stockhammer (2004) showed that increased power of shareholders over listed 
companies has reduced capital accumulation among NFCs in major OECD countries in 
aggregate. In a Regulationist framework, Boyer (2000) put forward a theoretical model, 
analysing the conditions for financialised growth (or, to use Boyer’s terminology, a finance-
led growth regime) to occur and its impact on macroeconomic stability.   
While much of the early debate within heterodox economics centred on non-financial firms, 
the change in their investment behaviour was clearly linked to a changing financial sector, set 
off by financial deregulation. Here, the rise of institutional investors (Clark, 2000; 
Toporowski, 2000; Langley, 2004) and more recently the growth of the shadow banking 
industry (Pozsar, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009; Pozsar et al., 2010; Kessler and Wilhelm, 
2013; Nesvetailova, 2014) have been central themes. Since the 1980s the assets of 
institutional investors such as pension funds, commercial insurers and investment companies 
have increased dramatically, especially in the UK and US. In both countries, institutional 
investors held assets twice the size of GDP by 2000, while this figure was a mere 50 per cent 
of GDP in 1980 (Evans, 2009). Toporowski (2000) argued that these companies’ financial 
investments contributed to share price inflation since their increasing demand for financial 
paper greatly outstripped listed firms’ equity issuance. Similarly, the shadow banking 
industry, which broadly defined contains all non-traditional banking institutions, contributed 
towards the inflation of housing prices in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Traditional 
banking institutions, which were exposed to closer regulatory scrutiny, could move loans and 
more innovative financial instruments such as collateralised debt obligations off balance 
sheet, using financial companies that were part of shadow banking (Pozsar et al., 2010). The 
hypothesis emerges that financialisation is fostered by financial deregulation (see H3). 
At least since the 1980s both advanced and developing countries have been advised by 
international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank to pursue international 
financial deregulation and integration
4
, based on the promise of greater financial sector 
efficiency and economic productivity (Levine and King, 1993). Increasingly frequent 
financial crises in emerging economies during the 1990s were taken as warning by some 
(Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1997; Wade and Veneroso, 1998) but conveniently 
overlooked by others (Levine, 2005; IMF, 2006). Financial liberalisation thus shaped 
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financial institutions, especially in emerging economies. This point was convincingly made in 
the aftermath of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis. Dymski (1999) and Arestis and Glickman 
(2002) showed that capital inflows into the economies of Southeast Asia set off a Minskyan 
process, inflating prices of equity and residential property. The process increased financial 
fragility and brought about financial and currency crises. This literature was the predecessor 
of a new research agenda, focusing on the distinctiveness of financialisation in developing 
countries. In this context, the destabilising impact of financial liberalisation has been 
critically explored in much detail by authors discussing financialisation in specific emerging 
markets (see Akkemik and Özen (2014) for Turkey, Babb (2005) and Levy (2013) for 
Mexico, Barbosa-Filho (2005) for Brazil, and Demir (2007) for Argentina, Mexico and 
Turkey). This research strand, much like the early contributions of heterodox economists, 
focuses on non-financial corporations and the macroeconomic consequences of their 
increased orientation towards financial profit. This literature stresses that the financialisation 
experiences of developing and emerging economies are heterogeneous, both vis-à-vis the US 
experience (Zhang, 2009), for example because poor countries have by definition a weaker 
domestic currency than the US (see Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018 for a case study of 
Brazil and Viktorov and Abramov, 2019 for one of Russia), but also within this country 
group. For instance, Becker et al. (2010) show that the crisis induced by foreign capital flows 
triggered a series of de-financialisation measures in Chile, while a similar crisis led to 
reforms favouring financialisation in Serbia. An important implication across this strand of 
literature is that financialisation is externally driven by foreign financial inflows (see H6). 
The question arises whether that is generally the case or specific to emerging markets.  
Since the financial crisis heterodox economists have turned their attention to households and 
the macroeconomic impact of the growth in debt-financed consumption (Cynamon and 
Fazzari, 2008). This strand of research emerged among applied mainstream economists, 
mainly those working for economic policy institutions such as the OECD and the US Federal 
Reserve, who highlighted increasing household consumption levels since the 1990s. The 
falling saving rates (especially among US households) that worried these institutions were 
explained through wealth effects generated by rising equity prices in the 1990s (Ludvigson 
and Steindel, 1999) and by soaring residential property prices in the 2000s (Case and 
Quigley, 2006; Girouard et al., 2006). Since households were regarded as rational and 
financial markets as efficient, rising household debt was not perceived as a threat to 
economic stability. In fact, the wealth effects literature developed independently of the 
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mainstream research on credit cycles that stressed the interplay between credit markets and 
economic instability (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Matsuyama, 2007). In the 
heterodox tradition, however, the role of credit was elaborated in Minskyan models of the 
business cycle where financial deregulation exacerbates instability and creates credit cycles 
(Charles, 2008; Fazzari, Ferri and Greenberg, 2008; Zhang and Bezemer, 2014). Credit 
bubbles have also been described as central characteristic of financialised economies such as 
the US and the UK, where capital gains on real estate and financial instruments become more 
lucrative than productive investment (Hudson, 2010) while transforming households into 
asset holders but also major debtors (Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2015). In short, this 
literature is, explicitly or implicitly, arguing that credit and asset price inflation, i.e. bubbles 
in equity and particularly real estate prices, have been an important driver of financialisation 
(see H7).   
Within financialisation research CPE has pioneered the analysis of financialisation and the 
household. CPE deals with the impact of finance on social and cultural norms.
5
 
Financialisation of everyday life in this view is a cultural process constructing new 
subjectivities (de Goede, 2004; Langley, 2007; Happer, 2017). Due to its methodological 
approach CPE has not given rise to an analysis of the economic mechanisms associated with 
the financialisation of households, but rather focused on its impact on the construction of 
identities. Only of late, has heterodox economics explicitly analysed the links between wage 
stagnation and household debt (Barba and Pivetti, 2008), between financialisation and 
inequality (ILO, 2008; Alvarez, 2015; Bengtsson and Ryner, 2015; Stockhammer, 2017; 
Santos, Rodrigues and Teles, 2017) and, most recently, between austerity, financialisation 
and household debt (Dowling, 2017; Oren and Blyth, 2018; Dagdeviren, Balasuriya, Luz, 
Malik and Shah, 2019). These are important research areas, closely linked to the question 
whether financialisation is inherently connected to specific demand regimes. Thus, from this 
research strand the hypothesis emerges that a debt-driven demand regime (as opposed to an 
export-driven or wage-led demand regime) is closely intertwined with financialisation (see 
H5).  
The empirical literature on financialisation is heavily skewed: first, most of the existing 
research has either investigated changes within a single country over time (Krippner, 2005; 
Davies, 2016; Röper, 2018) or focused on specific sectors across a small number of countries 
(Stockhammer, 2000; Demir, 2007; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2011). Second, most of the 
literature is on the US experience. Krippner’s (2005) influential study of the financialisation 
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of the US economy is a prime example (see also Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Orhangazi, 
2008). The skewed focus of empirical analysis is in part due to the fact that the US is the 
archetypical case of a financialised economy; better data availability also invites this focus. 
The overemphasis of the US case encouraged an interpretation of financialisation as a 
uniform process, implying the correlation of financialisation across economic sectors. 
Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) for instance refer to financialisation as characteristic for mature 
capitalism. This implies a ‘stagist’ understanding of financialisation based on an underlying 
central logic that drives the process. Engelen and Konings (2010) call this the modernist 
thesis of institutional convergence. The claim is that the increasing dominance of financial 
markets in capitalism leads to convergence of economic institutions across countries. In stark 
contrast, the literature on emerging markets financialisation discussed in relation to H6 
stresses the varying and country-specific incarnations of financialisation (see Becker et al., 
2010). Thus, the question arises whether there is one type of financialisation, i.e. the strong 
financialisation view, or whether the phenomenon varies across countries and sectors, i.e. 
variegated financialisation (see H1).    
Overall, financialisation research provides a diverse picture in that there is general agreement 
on the definition of financialisation, while actual research analyses quite distinct phenomena 
and posits different causal mechanisms. This diversity is amplified by the fact that different 
streams within financialisation build on different theories and have different disciplinary 
backgrounds. This is, to some extent what makes financialisation so rich and interesting, but 
it begs the question of coherence. Do these authors really talk about the same phenomenon? 
Are the different theories applied complementary or contradictory? At present the field lacks 
a systematic integration that identifies different analytical claims and it lacks an empirical 
evaluation of the explanatory power of the different arguments. The contribution of this paper 
is that it distils specific hypotheses from this literature that can be tested empirically.  
 
3. Formalising the research hypotheses 
The review of the literature on financialisation illustrates that while there is basic agreement 
on the phenomenon, different streams of the discussion use the term to describe varying 
aspects of it. We distinguish on the one hand between financialisation in different economic 
sectors and on the other hand between flow and stock measures. The sector, i.e. households, 
firms or the financial sector, matters because financialisation can proceed at different speeds 
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and the economic and social effects of say, financialisation of households and the 
financialisation of firms differ. We also distinguish between activity (flow) indicators to 
assess the relative importance of financial vis-à-vis real activity, and vulnerability (stock) 
measures. The activity or flow measure refers to the financial incomes or payments relative to 
total income. Several studies have used such measures (e.g. Krippner, 2005; Stockhammer, 
2004). Vulnerability is debt relative to income, which is used by post-Keynesian economists, 
pioneered by Hyman Minsky (1975), as a measure of financial fragility. Debt has to be 
serviced out of current income. An increase in interest rates or a fall in asset prices can easily 
push units with high debt to income ratios into or towards insolvency. 
Sectoral financialisation is examined in the light of the seven financialisation hypotheses, 
which we have identified from the literature. Since the purpose of the analysis is to establish 
whether the growing financialisation of a specific sector is associated with increased 
financialisation of other sectors and dimensions, we employ one-tailed correlation tests. Thus, 
we test whether positive correlations among the identified financialisation measures exist, 
which would imply positive associations across different dimensions of financialisation. 
First, given that the concept of financialisation has been used to refer to different phenomena, 
the question arises whether financialisation is best perceived as one process or whether 
financialisation in the different sectors proceeds relatively independently. In other words: Is 
there one financialisation process or are there several distinct and independent sectoral 
financialisation processes? This hypothesis (H1) will be operationalised by testing the 
correlation of all sectoral dimensions of financialisation across countries. Thus, if H1 is 
correct, country   should experience financialisation across the three sectors with similar 
relative intensity: 
H1:        
   
     , where   
  is the ranking of a financialisation indicator for sector   in 
country  . Sectors are households (HH), non-financial companies (NFC) and the financial 
sector (FIN). We will accept H1 if statistically significant correlations can be found for at 
least one financialisation measure across HH, NFC and FIN with each of the two remaining, 
private-sector aggregates. Due to data availability we only test this hypothesis for the decade 
before the crisis (1997-2007). Data measuring NFC financialisation is generally only 
available until 2012 (see table A1 in the appendix), providing us with only half of the 
necessary observations for most countries for the later time period (2008-2017). 
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The second hypothesis assesses the link between the investment slowdown observed in many 
OECD countries since the 1980s and financialisation. Some Marxist authors argue that a 
slowdown of investment precedes financialisation (Brenner, 2003). Thus, if there is an 
association between the two, countries with lower growth in investment rates in the decade 
prior to each of our periods of analysis (i.e. 1987-1997 or 1998-2007) should be the same 
ones that have high (stock and flow) measures of financialisation for the three sectors in the 
years running up to the financial crisis (1997-2007) or the decade since (2008-2017).   
H2:        
       
       , where       
    is the inverse ranking of countries based on their 
average growth rate for capital formation in the preceding decade (1987-1997 or 1998-2007). 
This means countries with lower growth rates are ranked higher. 
In the financialisation debate, an important role in bringing about the phenomenon is assigned 
to financial deregulation (Copley, 2017). Thus, H3 states that financialisation results from 
financial deregulation. If the hypothesis is correct the rankings of sectoral financialisation 
measures should correlate positively with our measure of financial deregulation. The 
financial reform index is only available until 2005. Hence, we only test this hypothesis for the 
decade before the crisis (1997-2007). H3 can be formalised as follows: 
H3:        
   
       , where   
    is the ranking of countries based on the financial reform 
index. 
A substantial part of the literature, in particular within the VoC approach, uses 
financialisation in the sense of a shift to more market-based forms of financial intermediation 
(Dore, 2008; see also the New Political Economy, 2002 debate). If the distinction between 
market-based and bank-based financial systems is useful to identify financialised countries, 
sectoral financialisation should be associated with our market-based/bank-based indicator. 
This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4:        
   
       , where   
    is the ranking of countries based on the market 
based/bank based measure. 
The recent post-Keynesian literature distinguishes between debt-driven and export-driven 
demand regimes (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013; Hein and Mundt 2013). Regulationists 
have proposed a similar, if analytically less rigorous, distinction (Becker and Jäger, 2012). 
We investigate whether this distinction is associated with financialisation, testing the 
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association between a debt-driven demand regime and financialisation measures across 
economic sectors.   
H5:        
   
       , where   
    is the ranking of countries based on the indicator for 
debt-driven/export-driven demand regimes that we have constructed. 
As discussed in section 2, research on emerging economies, in part based on Minskyan 
analyses, has argued that financialisation is often caused by the liberalisation of capital 
accounts allowing for unhindered inflows of financial capital, especially portfolio investment, 
from abroad (e.g. Arestis and Glickman, 2002; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018). Thus, we 
investigate to what extent financialisation positively correlates with financial inflows.  
H6:        
   
       , where   
    is the ranking of countries based on the foreign financial 
inflow measure. 
Finally, we want to explore the Minsky-inspired hypothesis that financialisation is associated 
with bubbles in asset prices, testing the association between real property prices and sectoral 
financialisation. 
H7:        
   
      , where   
   is the ranking of countries based on real house price 
inflation. 
To test these hypotheses, we have calculated the correlation among average values for 1997-
2007 and 2008-2017, for the five sectoral financialisation indicators and the seven 
explanatory measures that account for H2-H7. Focusing on the averages for the two periods 
allows us to study structural changes across these 17 countries, largely abstracting from 
cyclical movements brought about by business cycles. Distinguishing the two decades before 
and after the crisis we can pick up on any fundamental changes that might have been brought 
about by the global financial crisis. The next section discusses our data and methodology. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
Table 1 below summarises the activity and vulnerability measures of financialisation by 
economic sector. We distinguish between households, NFCs and financial companies, 
represented in the rows of Table 1. The second and third columns of the table provide the 
distinction between activity (flow) measures and financial vulnerability (stock) measures.  
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Table 1. here 
The activity measures suggested are gross financial income of households (as per cent of total 
income), gross financial income (as share of total income) by NFCs and value added
6
 as share 
of GDP for the financial sector. These measures capture the importance of financial activity 
vis-à-vis real activity. The indicators of financial vulnerability adopted are households’ and 
NFCs’ debt as share of their income and financial sector debt as share of GDP. The 
financialisation indicators for the finance sector are expressed as share of GDP (rather than 
sectoral income) since they capture the financial activity and vulnerability of the entire 
economy relative to its productive capacity. Data availability constrains the variables that can 
be compiled. Specifically, data on households’ income stream from their financial operations, 
which could serve as activity measure for households’ financialisation, is not available for a 
sufficient number of countries.
7
 Thus, we are limited to five sectoral financialisation 
measures, namely household debt, gross financial income of NFCs, NFCs’ debt, financial 
sector value added as well as financial sector debt. 
In order to test the seven hypotheses identified in the literature we use a cross-correlation 
analysis. The Spearman rank-order correlation has been employed to test the relationship 
between the different financialisation measures and the explanatory variables across our 
dataset, which consists of 17 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and the US).
8
  
The Spearman rank-order correlation test allows us to assess the degree to which a country 
and its individual economic sectors are financialised relative to other economies in the 
sample without defining rigid financialisation thresholds. Looking at the relative positions of 
economies vis-a-vis each other makes sense for the group of OECD countries chosen because 
as advanced economies they share similar institutions. Since the Spearman test enables us to 
focus on cross-country comparisons it is a preferred method to, for instance, a panel 
regression with fixed effects which could assess within-country changes. The Spearman test 
is a non-parametric test and can, therefore, be used in our small sample of 17 countries. It is a 
more general test of correlation than alternatives such as Pearson’s correlation index, since 
normality and linearity are not required (Corder and Foreman, 2014). 
The Spearman rank-order correlation analysis requires that the data are in ordinal scale. That 
is, for each indicator ranks are assigned to the countries in the order from high to low.
9
 Table 
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2 exemplifies this ordering for the five financialisation measures. The ranks shown refer to 
the average level of each measure for the period 1997-2007. Average values are provided in 
brackets for each country.  
Table 2. here 
In our sample household debt (displayed in column 2 of Table 2) has been highest in 
Denmark where it amounted to 253 per cent of households’ disposable income on average for 
the years 1997-2007. The Scandinavian country is followed by the Netherlands (213 per cent 
of disposable income) and then three Anglo-Saxon economies: Ireland (173 per cent), 
Australia (149 per cent) and the UK (127 per cent). Belgium (75 per cent), Italy (59 per cent) 
and Greece (46 per cent) have the lowest levels of household debt in this group. Similarly, 
countries have been ranked with respect to the financial income and the debt that their non-
financial corporations hold (columns 3 and 4 in Table 2) as well as value added and debt 
within the financial sector (columns 5 and 6). Data on household debt, NFCs and the 
financial sector value added are from the OECD. Financial sector debt is from Eurostat. A 
detailed overview of data sources and coverage is provided in table A.1 in the appendix. If 
the strong financialisation view (H1) is correct, the different financialisation measures will be 
highly correlated across all sectors.  
The explanatory factors representing H2-H7 are summarised in Table 3. H2 is captured by 
the OECD’s measure of annual change in gross capital formation. For H3, a normalised 
financial reform index obtained from the IMF has been utilised to capture financial 
deregulation (Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2008). The higher the index, the more 
financially deregulated a country with the value 1 assigned to economies that are perceived to 
be perfectly ‘reformed’ (or completely deregulated). To assess H4, the indicator for market-
based/bank-based financial systems has been obtained from the World Bank’s Financial 
Development and Structure Database. We employ the activity measure, also used by Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2009), which is the ratio of stock market value traded relative to 
bank credit as percent of GDP.  
Table 3. here 
For H5, we have constructed a demand-regime indicator, which is the arithmetic mean of the 
rank in terms of household debt and its inverse ranking with respect to net exports. Thus, the 
indicator is an ordinal measure, indicating whether a country possesses a more debt-driven or 
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a more export-driven demand regime (Hein, 2013). The higher a country is ranked with 
respect to the indicator, the more debt-driven its demand regime in relation to the other 17 
economies in our sample. Foreign financial inflows (for H6) are accounted for in terms of 
financial capital inflows, namely portfolio and other financial inflows, which have been 
identified as potentially fragility-inducing in the literature around financial liberalisation of 
emerging economies. Since foreign direct investment (FDI) tends to be long-term investment 
and less volatile, it has not been included in this measure. The individual components of the 
measure have been obtained from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2011). Finally, for H7 we utilise real house price indices sourced from the BIS to 
capture bubbles in residential property.  
 
5. Hypotheses testing and results 
Hypothesis 1 posits that financialisation occurs across all three economic sectors 
concurrently. To test this hypothesis, the Spearman correlation coefficients are calculated for 
our financialisation measures. If H1 holds, we should see strong positive correlations in 
financialisation measures across all sectors. Table 4 shows ten correlation coefficients 
between five sectoral financialisation dimensions. Household debt, our measure for 
household financialisation, correlates strongly with financialisation indicators for NFCs (with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.552), and the financial sector, that is the financial sector value 
added and financial sector debt (with correlation coefficients of 0.549 and 0.657, 
respectively). Only the activity measure for NFC financialisation is not correlated with 
household financialisation (0.232) which is in line with criticisms voiced against the 
limitations of NFCs’ financial income as financialisation measure (see, for instance, 
Christophers, 2012). However, we cannot detect any correlation between NFC and financial 
sector financialisation measures. Overall, five out of ten correlations are statistically 
significant. Given that one would expect some explanatory variables (as tested in H2 to H7) 
to drive these variables and that we cannot find correlation among financialisation measures 
for all three sectors, we regard this as low and conclude that the evidence is not supportive of 
the strong financialisation view.
10
 
Table 4. here 
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 The lack of significant association between financialisation measures for the financial sector 
and NFCs is surprising given the origins of the financialisation research agenda. The early 
financialisation studies focused on the interaction between financial and corporate sector, be 
it from the perspective of falling corporate investment rates or rising shareholder value 
orientation (as reviewed in section 2). Similarly, the VoC literature and its idea of 
complementarity between financial and productive structures in different types of market 
economies would suggest a close link between financialisation of NFCs and financial sector 
financialisation. In contrast, our results suggest that the impact of the financial sector on 
households’ financialisation seems to be more important since household financialisation is 
associated with financial sector value added. Overall, the three economic sectors are not 
moving in lockstep in terms of financialisation, providing evidence for a variegated 
financialisation view. 
To illustrate this point further Table 5 visualises the rankings of our five sectoral 
financialisation measures through colour coding. The 17 sample countries are arranged in 
quartiles with respect to their relative position in the country ranking for each financialisation 
indicator. We will refer to these as ‘high’ (top quartile), ‘medium high’ (second quartile), 
‘medium low’ (third quartile) and ‘low’ (bottom quartile), respectively.11 The quartile labels 
in the table have been colour-coded, with darker shadings indicating higher levels of 
financialisation. Strikingly the three Anglo-Saxon countries UK, US, and (where data is 
available) Australia show signs of financialisation across all three sectors, figuring either high 
or medium high on all sectoral measures. In contrast, Austria, Greece, and Italy rank low or 
medium low on our five financialisation measures. However, most countries simultaneously 
figure high/medium high and low/medium low on at least one of the sectoral financialisation 
indicators. This means generally we do not find supporting evidence that financialisation has 
happened simultaneously across all economic sectors. Thus, we reject H1, concluding that 
financialisation is not a uniform process, but diverges across sectors in different countries.   
Table 5. here 
Table 6 reports the correlation between the measures for financialisation hypotheses H2 to 
H7 and the financialisation by sector for the periods 1997-2007 and 2008-2017. We will refer 
to the evidence for a hypothesis as supportive if we find two or more statistically significant 
correlations and as of limited support if we find one statistically significant correlation. For 
H2, the Marxist investment slowdown hypothesis, we find no statistically significant 
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correlation. In other words, we cannot detect any effect of a secular investment slowdown 
onto financialisation. This result holds also for both periods. In contrast, we find that 
financial deregulation, H3, is positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
household debt (with a correlation coefficient of 0.525) and both measures of financial sector 
financialisation (with coefficients of 0.386 for financial sector value added and 0.691 for 
financial sector debt) for the years 1997-2007. The financialisation measures for NFC do not 
show significant correlations with the financial deregulation measures (with correlation 
coefficients of 0.283 for NFC gross financial income and 0.408 for NFC debt). Thus, we find 
support for H3. Since the financial reform index is only available until 2005, we cannot test 
H3 for the decade after the global financial crisis.  
Table 6. here 
We find limited support that the market-based/bank-based indicator captures financialisation 
trends in the three sectors (H4). Only the correlation with NFC debt (0.386) is statistically 
significant for the decade before the crisis. In the later period (2008-2017) even this limited 
evidence supporting H4 disappears. In other words, the shift from bank-based to market-
based financial systems at most might affect NFCs, but not other sectors of the economy. If in 
fact there is an impact at all since the Spearman rank-correlation test for 2008-2017 does not 
show any statistical significance between H4 and the sectoral financialisation measures. 
In contrast, the debt-driven/export-driven demand regime measure is positively correlated 
with financialisation measures across all economic sectors in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
For instance, household debt associates positively with this explanatory indicator (0.587). 
This is not surprising since the indicator is constructed using countries’ relative levels of 
household indebtedness. More importantly, the measure also correlates with NFC debt 
(0.543), capturing the financialisation of the non-financial corporate sector, and financial 
sector value added (0.506), our measure of financial activity for financial corporations.
12
 In 
the later decade, the growth regime remains significantly correlated with households debt 
(0.542) and financial sector value added (0.366). But the link between debt-driven growth 
and NFC financialisation disappears. Overall, we find support for H5 that demand regimes 
and the degree of financialisation are correlated. This means the demand regime exercises a 
general effect on the economy where countries characterised by debt-driven demand are 
likely to be financialised. This result is consistent with our findings under H1. While we 
could not confirm a uniform financialisation process that converges across sector, we found 
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that especially household and financial sector financialisation are closely interlinked. This 
interaction is likely to be produced in a debt-driven demand regime where the growth of the 
financial sector goes hand in hand with rising household debt, in turn financing consumption. 
There is evidence that the debt-driven demand regime is interlinked with financialisation 
across all three private-sector aggregates since H5 is significantly correlated with 
financialisation measures for households, NFCs and the financial sector for the period before 
the crisis.  
In the run-up to the global financial crisis, measures of foreign financial inflows were not 
correlated with increasing levels of financial activity or financial vulnerability across the 
three economic aggregates with the sole exception of financial sector debt. Most of the 
correlation coefficients are very small (around 0.1-0.2). However, the link between financial 
inflows and the vulnerability measure for the financial sector (i.e. financial sector debt) is 
strong, with a correlation of 0.873 (which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). 
Since the crisis a significant link between financial inflows and NFC debt can be detected 
(0.53). Overall, there is limited support for H6.
13
 This may be due to our focus on OECD 
economies whereas H6 has been formulated in the context of emerging and developing 
economies. 
Finally, concerning H7, house price inflation is positively associated with vulnerability 
measures across all three sectors. This means house price inflation is correlated with 
household debt (yielding a correlation coefficient of 0.508), NFC debt (0.527) and financial 
sector debt (0.473) between 1997-2007. Thus, there is strong empirical support for H7. 
However, when considering the period 2008-2017 the link between house price inflation and 
financial sector debt disappears, suggesting a decline in financial companies’ enthusiasm to 
support mortgage extension, fuelling surges in real estate prices after the crisis. Nevertheless, 
the evidence suggests a strong link between house price inflation and financialisation across 
the three private-sectors economic aggregates. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Financialisation is an empirical phenomenon that has given rise to different theoretical 
explanations. The paper set out to investigate seven financialisation hypotheses and assesses 
their explanatory power. We have undertaken a cross-country analysis for 17 OECD 
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economies for the two time periods 1997-2007 and 2008-2017. To summarise our findings, 
there is only weak support for the strong financialisation view, i.e. the idea that 
financialisation converges across the three economic sectors, households, businesses and the 
financial sector. In particular, surprisingly, the financialisation of businesses and the financial 
sector do not seem to be correlated. We find no evidence for the Marxist hypothesis that 
financialisation is preceded by a secular slowdown in investment. This means the prominent 
Marxist argument that financialisation can be understood as the result of NFCs abandoning 
productive investment in favour of financial activities because of low profitability (and thus 
low growth) is not supported in our sample (Brenner, 2003). There is very limited evidence 
that financialisation can be understood as a shift from a bank-based to a more market-based 
financial structure as suggested by some financialisation proponents (Lapavitsas, 2009, 2012; 
Aglietta and Breton, 2010) and the VoC literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Hence, the 
distinction between bank-based and market-based economies (or CMEs and LMEs) as 
propagated by the VoC literature might be useful when discussing the financialisation of 
NFC, but not financialisation across the economy more broadly. Equally, there is limited 
evidence that financial globalisation in the form of foreign financial inflows drives 
financialisation but it appears to induce financial sector debt and has spread to NFC debt 
since the crisis.   
In contrast, we find that financial deregulation has contributed to financialisation of 
households and the financial sector and that demand regimes are correlated with 
financialisation. Hence, debt-driven economies have higher household debt levels and, 
crucially, also increased NFC indebtedness combined with heightened financial activity 
(measured in value added) of the financial sector. On the one hand, our results confirm the 
view that the changes in financial markets that have been under way since the 1980s, 
particularly deregulation, have importantly contributed to financialisation as argued by Clark 
(2000) and Toporowski (2000) for pension funds. This also means that the phenomenon of 
shadow banking, most recently identified as an essential aspect of financial market 
deregulation, deserves more attention in financialisation research going forward. A debt-
driven demand regime also favours financialisation across all three economic sectors. These 
findings give renewed importance to research efforts that identify varying demand regimes 
across countries (such as Hein, 2013 and Stockhammer, 2013).  
We find correlations between asset price inflation and the financialisation of households, 
NFC and the financial sector. OECD countries whose housing markets were characterised by 
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high prices in the run-up to the financial crisis also experienced high household indebtedness 
as well as high debt among non-financial corporations and financial companies. Thus, there is 
some evidence that Minsky-type processes are at work when households, NFC and the 
financial sector get caught up in the financialisation process. But we only find an effect 
across all three private-sector aggregates, households, NFCs and financial firms, for the first 
period (1997-2007) while the link between house price inflation and financial sector 
financialisation severs subsequently (2008-2017). Nevertheless, our findings point towards 
the crucial relevance of models of financial instability and post-Keynesian models of credit 
cycles for financialisation research. Hence, our findings suggest that shadow banking, 
demand regimes and asset price inflation are important aspects to consider in future 
financialisation research.  
Our analysis is a cross-country study of advanced economies for the pre- and post-crisis 
decade. Its findings may be specific to this sample. This points to three further directions for 
future research. First, our analysis has focused on differences across countries and should be 
complemented by an analysis of changes within countries over time. Second, we have 
focused on two particular time periods, the years before (1997-2007) and after the global 
financial crisis (2008-2017). This was in part motivated by data availability. Where possible 
the analysis should be extended to cover earlier decades. We should note that real estate 
booms in many countries were a specificity of this period and it is fully consistent with our 
approach if earlier experiences of financialisation differ. Third, the country sample is 
constrained by data availability. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to include 
emerging economies and to financial centre city states. For example, we would expect a 
stronger role of capital inflows in emerging economies.   
Our findings suggest that, at least for our sample, some theories of financialisation are more 
useful than others. Thus, the established working definition of financialisation (Epstein, 
2005) appears to have shortcomings. The hypotheses based on post-Keynesian theory (H5 
and H7) have received more support than the ones underpinned by Marxist theory (H2) and 
by VoC theory (H3). We fail to find full support for what we have called the strong 
financialisation view. In contrast, we propose a variegated financialisation approach: 
financialisation is not a single process that occurs across all economic sectors simultaneously. 
Rather sectoral financialisation processes are distinct and relatively independent. They 
proceed for different reasons and, potentially, with different effects. The financialisation of 
households, businesses and the financial sector has distinct causes. Moreover, these sectoral 
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financialisation processes can have effects on the economy as a whole that work in opposite 
directions. The financialisation of non-financial firms has been found to dampen investment 
expenditure (Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008; Tori and Onaran 2016), whereas 
households’ financialisation is likely to increase consumption financed by credit. While the 
former phenomenon has a negative effect on aggregate demand, the latter has a positive one. 
The overall macroeconomic result depends therefore on sectoral interactions. For instance, 
Stockhammer, Durand and List (2016) point out that real estate bubble-driven financialisation 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries differed from financialisation in southern Europe. Only in the 
former countries did it come with sharply rising inequality and strong welfare state 
retrenchment. Our approach suggests that we need theories that allow for variation in 
financialisation experiences and effects. Nevertheless, there seem to be structural 
commonalities in rich countries concerning the process of financialisation. Our evidence 
suggests that financalisation is best understood as a process mainly driven by financial 
deregulation, debt accumulation and asset price inflation. If our sample is any guide, theories 
that explain asset price dynamics, the interaction of financialisation and demand regimes, and 
theories that help to understand the complex impact of financial deregulation on the working 
of the financial sector are key in furthering the research agenda on financialisation.  
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Table 1. Financial activity and financial vulnerability measures of financialisation by sector 
                                 Indicator                              
Sector 
 
Activity measure Vulnerability measure 
Households Gross financial income  
(% of total income) 
Household debt 
(% of disposable income) 
Non-financial companies Gross financial income  
(% of total income) 
Non-financial companies’ debt  
(% of total income) 
Financial sector Financial sector value added 
(% of GDP) 
Financial sector debt  
(% of GDP) 
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Table 2. Country rankings for sectoral financialisation measures (average 1997-2007) 
 
  
Rank Households
Debt (% disposable 
income)
Gross financial 
income 
(dividends+interes
t received, % 
income)
Debt (% income)
Value added (% 
GDP)
Debt (financial 
liabilities % GDP)
1 Denmark (253%) Sweden (41%) Netherlands (1370%) Australia (8.24%) Ireland (1138%)
2 Netherlands (213%) France (34%) UK (1101%) Ireland (8.24%) Netherlands (685%)
3 Ireland (173%) Denmark (27%) Spain (949%) US (7.44%) UK (620%)
4 Australia (149%) Belgium (27%) Portugal (868%) Netherlands (7.08%) Belgium (413%)
5 UK (127%) Netherlands (21%) France (824%) Portugal (6.48%) Denmark (393%)
6 Sweden (126%) UK (19%) Finland (782%) UK (6.23%) Germany (387%)
7 US (117%) US (19%) Denmark (752%) Belgium (5.69%) France (273%)
8 Portugal (114%) Finland (18%) Belgium (735%) Japan (5.49%) Sweden (269%)
9 Japan (112%) Italy (15%) Sweden (723%) Austria (5.11%) Austria (266%)
10 Spain (110%) Portugal (14%) Ireland (662%) Denmark (4.92%) Portugal (265%)
11 Germany (110%) Austria (12%) Italy (655%) Italy (4.92%) Spain (220%)
12 France (84%) Germany (12%) Germany (629%) Germany (4.92%) Italy (196%)
13 Finland (82%) Spain (12%) Greece (580%) Spain (4.76%) Greece (156%)
14 Austria (79%) Greece (9%) Austria (553%) Greece (4.41%) Finland (151%)
15 Belgium (75%) Japan (7%) Sweden (4.20%)
16 Italy (59%) Ireland (5%) France (3.78%)
17 Greece (46%) Finland (2.99%)
Non-financial companies Financial sector
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Table 3. Indicators for testing hypothesis H2-H6 
Hypothesis Indicator 
H2: Growth in investment rates Gross capital formation (annual % 
change) 
H3: Financial deregulation Financial reform index1 (range: 0-1) 
H4: Market-based vs. bank-based financial 
systems 
Ratio: stock market value traded (% 
GDP)/bank credit (% GDP) 
H5: Debt-driven vs. export-driven demand 
regimes 
Household debt and inversed raking of 
net export position (both % GDP) 
H6: Foreign financial inflows Inflow of portfolio and other 
investment (excluding FDI), % of GDP 
H7: Asset price bubbles Real house price index (base year 
1997=100) 
 
  
                                                          
1
 The financial reform index compiled by the IMF is multi-dimensional containing information on seven 
different dimensions of the financial sector, i.e. credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking regulation, and restrictions on 
the capital account. 
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Table 4. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients for economic sectors (1997-2007) 
 
 
 
Household 
debt 
NFC gross 
financial 
income  
NFC debt Financial 
sector value 
added 
Financial 
sector debt 
Household debt 1 
    
NFC gross 
financial income 
0.232 1 
   
NFC debt 0.552*** 0.371* 1 
  
Financial sector 
value added 
0.549*** -0.191 0.191 1 
 
Financial sector 
debt 
0.657*** 0.213 0.266 0.679*** 1 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for one-tailed 
tests 
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Table 5. Sample countries arranged by ranking quartiles for 5 sectoral financialisation indicators 
(1997-2007) 
 
Note: mhigh and mlow stand for medium high and medium low respectively. 
 
  
Households
Debt
Financial 
income
Debt 
Value 
added
Debt
Australia high high
Austria low mlow low mlow mlow
Belgium low high mlow mhigh mhigh
Denmark high high mhigh mlow mhigh
Finland mlow mhigh mhigh low low
France mlow high mhigh low mhigh
Germany mlow mlow low mlow mhigh
Greece low low low low low
Ireland high low mlow high high
Italy low mlow mlow mlow low
Japan mlow low mhigh
Netherlands high mhigh high high high
Portugal mhigh mlow mhigh mhigh mlow
Spain mlow low high mlow mlow
Sweden mhigh high mlow low mlow
UK mhigh mhigh high mhigh high
US mhigh mhigh high
Non-financial firms Financial Sector
 37 
Table 6. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients for financialisation hypotheses and 
economic sectors (1997-2007 and 2008-2017) 
 
  
Time period 1997-2007 2008-2017 1997-2007 2008-2017 1997-2007 2008-2017 1997-2007 2008-2017 1997-2007 2008-2017
Investment 
slowdown
-0.353 -0.542 0.338 0.1 -0.284 -0.156 -0.75 -0.208 -0.495 -0.002
Financial 
deregulation
0.525** n/a 0.283 n/a 0.408 n/a 0.386* n/a 0.691*** n/a
Market-based/ 
bank-based 
systems
0.003 0.081 0.321 0.256 0.376* 0.059 -0.348 -0.167 -0.389 0.059
Debt-driven/ 
export-driven 
demand regimes
0.587*** 0.542** -0.021 0.063 0.543** 0.245 0.506** 0.366* 0.206 -0.015
Foreign financial 
inflows
0.3 0.326 0.147 0.159 0.292 0.53** 0.248 0.299 0.873*** 0.556**
House price 
inflation
0.508** 0.385* 0.181 0.659*** 0.527 0.1 0.235 0.011 0.473* 0.0
Financial sector 
value added
Financial sector debtHousehold debt
NFC gross financial 
income 
NFC debt
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Data sources and indicator coverage 
 
  
Indicators Coverage Data source Notes
Household debt 1997-2017 BIS Data for Ireland are only available from 2001, for 
Spain only from 2000. Data for Australia, Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland and Japan are only available until 
2016.
Non-financial companies' gross 
financial income
1997-2014 OECD Data for Australia are not available, data for the US 
start in 1998, for Spain in 2000, for Ireland in 2002, 
and for Greece in 2005. Data are generally only 
available until 2012, except for US where data 
availability stops in 2011. For Denmark, Italy, 
Portugal and Sweden data are available until 2013, 
for Japan until 2014.
Non-financial companies' debt 1997-2013 OECD Data for Australia, Japan and the US are not 
available. Data for Spain are only available from 
1999, for Ireland from 2002, and for Greece from 
2005. Data are generally only available until 2012, 
except for Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Sweden 
where data are available until 2013.
Financial sector value added 1997-2017 OECD Data for Ireland are only available until 2015, for 
Australia, Japan, the UK and US only until 2016.
Financial sector debt 1997-2017 Eurostat Data for Australia, Japan and the US are not 
available. Data for Ireland are only available from 
2001.
Investment rate 1987-2007 OECD All country data available.
Financial deregulation 1997-2005 Abiad et al., 2008, IMF All country data available.
Bank-based versus market-based 
index
1997-2016 World Bank: Financial 
Development and 
Structure Dataset (update 
July 2018)
Data for Denmark, Finland and Sweden are only 
available until 2012, from Belgium, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK only until 
2014. Data for 1998 and 1999 are missing for 
Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands.
Debt-driven vs. export-driven growth 
regime
1997-2017 Household debt: BIS, Net 
exports: World Bank
Composite indicator constructed using household 
debt and net export data. Data for Ireland are only 
available from 2001, for Spain only from 2000. 
Household debt data for Australia, Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland and Japan are only available until 
2016. Net export data for Japan and the US are 
only available until 2016.
Financial globalisation 1997-2015 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
database
All country data available.
Real house prices 1997-2017 Nominal house prices: BIS, 
Consumer price deflator: 
OECD
Data for Austria, Greece and Portugal not 
available.
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Table A.2. Country rankings for financialisation hypotheses, (average 1997-2007) 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 van der Zwan (2014) provides a similar classification, identifying three main groups of financialisation 
theories. She, however, distinguishes among financialisation approaches that (1) address changing accumulation 
regimes, (2) are based on the concept of shareholder value and (3) focus on the financialisation of everyday life. 
These three categories correspond to our distinction between (1) macroeconomic, (2) mesoeconomic and (3) 
microeconomic approaches to financialisation. 
2
 Within the VoC approach Vitols (2014) argues that the effects of financialisation, which he equates with the 
role of institutional investors, are mitigated by labour market institutions. This means even within VoC 
financialisation can have different outcomes in different countries. 
3
 Corbett (1987) argued that borrowing by Japanese non-financial firms effectively had an equity-like character 
since Japanese banks had considerable control over their clients’ investment decisions. She challenged the 
Rank
Investment 
slowdown
Financial 
deregulation
Market-based vs. 
bank-based 
financial system
Demand regime-driven 
financialisation
Driven by foreign 
financial inflows
Asset price 
inflation-driven 
financialisation
Average annual 
investment growth 
rate (1987-1997)
Financial reform 
index (0=closed 
financial system; 
1=fully open 
financial system)
Market-based vs. 
bank-based 
indicator (ratio: 
stock market value 
traded (% 
GDP)/bank credit (% 
GDP)) 
Debt-driven vs. export-
driven demand regime 
(household debt & net 
exports, % GDP)
Financial 
globalisation 
(inflow of portfolio 
and other 
investment*, % of 
GDP)
House price 
indicator (base 
year 1997=100)
1 Sweden (0.84%) Australia (1.0) US (353%) Australia (149%, -1.5%) Ireland (417%) UK (170)
2 Finland (1.43%) France (1.0) Finland (174%) UK (127%, -1.9%) UK (238%) Ireland (161)
3 Greece (1.63%) Ireland (1.0) Sweden (154%) Portugal (114%, -8.8%) Netherlands (219%) Spain (156)
4 Italy (1.90%) UK (1.0) Spain (110%) US (117%, -3.8%) Belgium (208%) Sweden (151)
5 France (2.07%) Spain (0.99) Netherlands (95%) Denmark (253%, 5.4%) Portugal (142%) Netherlands (147)
6 Denmark (2.43%) US (0.99) France (82%) Spain (110%, -3.0%) Austria (140%) France (145)
7 Germany (2.86%) Denmark (0.98) Greece (80%) Japan (113%, 1.5%) Denmark (117%) Australia (145)
8 Japan (3.39%) Netherlands (0.97) Australia (77%) Greece (46%, -9.8%) Germany (106%) US (137)
9 US (3.46%) Belgium (0.96) Italy (75%) Netherlands (213%, 7.2%) France (105%) Denmark (134)
10 UK (3.51%) Sweden (0.95) UK (64%) France (84%, 1.3%) Sweden (102%) Belgium (129)
11 Austria (3.55%) Italy (0.91) Japan (54%) Ireland (173%, 12.7%) Spain (86%) Finland (127)
12 Netherlands (3.62%) Germany (0.90) Germany (51%) Sweden (126%, 6.7%) Greece (86%) Italy (113)
13 Belgium (4.27%) Austria (0.87) Denmark (46%) Germany (110%, 3.2%) Finland (85%) Germany (92)
14 Australia (4.38%) Japan (0.85) Belgium (31%) Italy (59%, 1.0%) Italy (81%) Japan (83)
15 Spain (4.56%) Greece (0.83) Portugal (24%) Austria (79%, 2.1%) Australia (64%)
16 Portugal (6.82%) Portugal (0.82) Ireland (18%) Belgium (75%, 3.9%) US (56%)
17 Ireland (6.85%) Finland (0.81) Austria (11%) Finland (84%, 7.0%) Japan (32%)
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dichotomy of bank borrowing and equity issuance by NFCs across countries and questioned whether financial 
institutions can easily be reduced to bank-based versus market-based systems.  
4
 Many developing countries, especially in Africa, took on financial liberalisation as part of the IMF’s and 
World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes. 
5
 These norms can then of course influence financial activity again like in the case of changing risk 
perceptions (Besedovsky, 2017). 
6
 Gross operating surplus for the financial sector was considered as alternative measures. Gross operating 
surplus and value added for the sector are, however, highly correlated. Hence, the measures can be expected to 
yield very similar results.  
7
 Financial income data are available for households from Eurostat. Unfortunately, the data only cover 10 of our 
17 sample countries and were consequently not included in the analysis. 
8
 For Canada only one of our five sectoral financialisation measures, household debt, was available. 
Luxembourg is a small country and an international financial centre. It is therefore not readily comparable to the 
other OECD countries examined and was excluded as special case from this study. However, it raises an 
interesting point. Tax havens and international financial centres do feature high in cross country financialisation 
measures. But the main financialisation theories do not usually treat such cases explicitly.  
9
 If measures show exactly the same level of financialisation for two or more countries the same rank is assigned 
to these economies. This is only the case for the financial reforms index and the measure of demand regimes 
(see Table 3). The financial reforms index is normalised between 0 and 1, which explains why several countries 
are assigned the value 1, for a completely liberalised financial system. The demand regime indicator is a 
composite measure composed of two ordinal rankings, which means the same rank can be obtained for more 
than one country. 
10
 We have also carried out annual Spearman rank-order correlations to test H1 for the period 1997-2007. The 
results are essentially the same and available from the authors on request. 
11
 In our sample of 17 economies four countries have been labelled ‘high’, ‘mhigh’ and ‘low’, respectively, 
while the groups medium low (labelled ‘mlow’) contains five countries. For the ranking for financial 
deregulation five countries (Australia, France, Ireland and the UK) have been labelled as ‘high’ because all five 
have the same average value for the indicator for the period 1997-2007, namely 1.0.  
12
 These statistically significant correlations remain present when considering annual correlations. 
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13
 The result does not change when considering annual Spearman correlations for the two different periods 
identified. 
